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Summary: The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU is causing a 
strong political, legal and, last but not least, social turmoil. Arguably, 
the impact is even greater for children who are growing up as part of 
the Union, and belong to families of mixed nationalities, and/or have 
cross-border relations to different states and educational systems. The 
interpretation of the post-Brexit EU law rights of children with British 
nationality should fi rst examine the pre-Brexit children’s rights under 
the European freedom of movement law to assess the exact scope of 
the change that the removal of European citizenship will entail.
An overview of the case law of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) on 
the freedom of movement rights demonstrates an evolution in the under-
standing of the rights of children under EU law, a development which 
observes more and more children’s specifi c needs, as embodied in chil-
dren’s fundamental rights provisions. This development came about in 
a sporadic fashion, shifting between treating children’s rights as ancil-
lary add-ons to their parents’ EU law market rights and acknowledging 
children’s individual rights. Eventually, the ECJ attempted to reinforce 
the latter approach by examining children’s Union citizenship and rights 
under EU law by referencing children’s fundamental rights, enshrined 
in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, for the sake of maintaining “children’s equilibrium”. 
The referring to the so-called ‘“children’s equilibrium”’ would suggest 
that a respective child-related approach was adopted in the inter-
pretation of European law via which the stated equilibrium could be 
achieved. Yet, apart from the inclusion of Article 24 in the legal dis-
cussion, the development of a comprehensive child-related approach 
with a view to the securing of children’s equilibrium requires further 
judicial engagement in two main directions. Namely, the need for more 
guidance remains, especially along the lines of elaborating the EU’s 
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uniform children’s rights obligations and making sure that children are 
seen as individual rights holders.  
On the basis of these existing criteria, for the purpose of this paper 
a child-related approach is to indicate the consideration and integra-
tion of children’s rights in the legal reasoning, by regarding children 
as independent rights-bearing individuals. The paper will argue that 
the upcoming legal uncertainties could be levelled down if the goal of 
maintaining children’s equilibrium through the child-related approach 
was applied in the interpretation of the EU law-related rights of chil-
dren with British nationality. Further, since the proposed approach 
could also be based on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it 
could also serve as a bridge for the application of the “children’s equi-
librium” approach in the UK with a view to a time when the Charter is 
not to be applicable any longer.
1. Introduction
‘The [European] Council has not defended the rights of its citizens, 
be they British or from the other EU27 countries. […] You and the UK 
have negotiated away some of the most fundamental rights of over 4 
million committed Europeans and at the end of the transition we will 
fi nd ourselves in a far poorer position’.1 This harsh statement is part of a 
letter to the President of the European Council, Mr. Donald Tusk, by the 
campaign groups the3million and British in Europe, which are stated to 
represent approximately 4.6 million citizens affected by Brexit. 
Undoubtedly, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU is caus-
ing strong political, legal and, last but not least, social turmoil. UK cit-
izens living in the Member States and, conversely, European citizens 
residing in the UK, are currently in a state of legal limbo, which will 
affect their lives. On the one hand, the current state of the discussion 
on the withdrawal conditions poses the threat of a no-deal scenario,2 
which could lead to numerous subsequent uncertainties, including those 
related to the residence rights of citizens.3 On the other, some of the pro-
posed measures for the post-Brexit period, such as the UK’s EU Settle-
1 L O’Carroll, ‘EU Leaders Accused of Not Protecting Citizens’ Rights in Brexit Deal’ The 
Guardian (21 March 2018, London) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/
mar/21/eu-leaders-accused-of-not-protecting-citizens-rights-in-brexit-deal> accessed 14 
April 2018.
2  D Boffey, ‘EU Assault on May’s White Paper Heightens “No Deal” Brexit Fears’ The Guard-
ian (18 July 2018, London) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/18/eu-as-
sault-on-mays-white-paper-heightens-no-deal-brexit-fears> accessed 27 July 2018.
3 ‘EU Settlement Scheme: Statement of Intent. An Analysis by the3million’ (The3million, 11 
July 2018) 5 <https://www.the3million.org.uk/publications> accessed 27 July 2018.
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ment Scheme, prepared by the Home Offi ce, demonstrate that the initial 
promises on the rights of EU citizens − in terms of the declaration that 
there will be no change for those who are already lawfully residing in the 
UK − will not be kept.4   
Brexit-related confusion is unfolding against the background of the 
process of European integration, which has enabled EU citizens to build 
numerous and multifaceted ties with different Member States. Arguably, 
the impact is even greater for children who are growing up as part of 
the Union, and belong to families of mixed nationalities, and/or have 
cross-border relations to different states and educational systems.5 The 
Brexit consequences could turn out to be obstacles for children who have 
ties with several Member States and would like to maintain these. The 
interpretation of the post-Brexit EU law rights of children with British 
nationality should fi rst examine pre-Brexit children’s rights under the 
European freedom of movement law in order to assess the exact scope of 
the change that the removal of European citizenship will entail.
An overview of the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
on the freedom of movement rights demonstrates an evolution in the un-
derstanding of the rights of children under EU law, a development which 
observes more and more children’s specifi c needs, as embodied in chil-
dren’s fundamental rights provisions. This is not to say that the gradu-
al development came about in a smooth and non-contradictory fashion. 
Quite the opposite, when children’s rights were simply understood as 
ancillary add-ons to their parents’ European ‘economic, mobile citizen-
ship’6 and/or related rights, the children’s own rights were neglected in 
the discussion. Yet, if children were considered as autonomous holders of 
their own freedom of movement rights, their rights would be interpreted 
with consideration to their entitlement to care,7 the best interest prin-
4 Some campaign groups have argued that there are several troubling main aspects of the 
proposed EU Settlement Scheme. A major concern is the requirement for the application 
for settlement status, which could lead to many not applying and not acquiring the sta-
tus. Children appear to be a group at particular risk, since their registration is bound to 
be conditional on their parents or carers. In this regard, there have been arguments that 
systems for EU nationals ‘must avoid an increase in children fi nding themselves undoc-
umented as a result of practical barriers or policy decisions’. See ‘Brexit and Children’s 
Rights’ (Coram) <www.childrenslegalcentre.com/promoting-childrens-rights/policy/brex-
it-childrens-rights/> accessed 19 August 2018.
5 ‘Brexit: Children’s Rights at Risk or Future Opportunity in the Global Era?’ (Coram, Lon-
don 2017) 7.
6 C O’Brien, ‘I Trade, Therefore I Am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’ (2013) 50(6) 
Common Market Law Review 1647.
7 For instance, in Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment ECLI:EU:C:2002:434, children’s entitlement to care was the anchoring element for the 
residence rights of their third-country national carer. The judgment is examined in greater 
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ciple,8 and the diverse ties children can have with parents, carers, and 
different states.9 
Eventually, the ECJ attempted to reinforce the latter approach by 
examining children’s Union citizenship and rights under EU law by ref-
erencing children’s fundamental rights10 as enshrined in Article 24 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This approach, 
termed ‘children’s equilibrium’,11 entails the elaboration of the dependen-
cy relationship between a child with Union citizenship and his or her 
third-country national parent with consideration to: the best interests of 
the child, the age of the child, the child’s physical and emotional devel-
opment, the extent of his or her emotional ties to both parents/carers, 
and the risks which a separation from the third-country national parent 
can pose for the child’s wellbeing. The paying of greater attention to the 
multifaceted needs of children is welcomed in the light of the previous 
lack of discussion on the topic. 
Reference to the so-called ‘children’s equilibrium’ would suggest 
that a respective child-related approach was adopted in the interpreta-
tion of the European law through which the stated equilibrium could be 
achieved. Yet, apart from the inclusion of Article 24 in the legal discus-
sion, the development of a comprehensive child-related approach with a 
view to securing children’s equilibrium requires further judicial engage-
ment in two main directions. Namely, as academic scholarship indicates, 
the need for more guidance remains, especially along the lines of elabo-
rating the EU’s uniform children’s rights obligations12 and making sure 
that children are seen as individual rights holders.13 
detail below in part 3.1 Children’s entitlement to care and the right to family life.
8 To exemplify, in Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:85, the Court states that the best interest of the child trumps the free 
movement of goods, given that proper proportionality is executed.  
9 For example, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:2003:539; and 
Case C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul ECLI:EU:C:2008:559.
10 Case C-133/15 HC Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verze-
keringsbank and Others ECLI:EU:C:2017:354, para 72.
11 Chavez-Vilchez (n 10) para 72; Case C-82/16 KA, MZ, MJ, NNN, OIO, RI, BA v Belgische 
Staat ECLI:EU:C:2018:308, para 72.
12 I refer to criticism of the ECJ’s sporadic and uncomprehensive engagement with the issue 
of children’s rights and the omission of discussion on the relation between their rights and 
social rights, stemming from European legal discourse. See O’Brien (n 6) 1644; H Stalford, 
‘The CRC in Litigation under EU Law’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E Doek (eds), Litigating the 
Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and Internation-
al Jurisprudence (Springer 2015) 229.
13  H Stalford, K Hollingsworth and S Gilmore, ‘Introducing Children’s Rights Judgments’ 
in Helen Stalford, Kathryn Hollingsworth and Stephen Gilmore (eds), Rewriting Children’s 
Rights Judgments: From Academic Vision to New Practice (Hart Publishing 2017) 5.
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On the basis of these existing criteria, for the purpose of the paper, 
a child-related approach is to indicate the integration and consideration 
of children’s rights in the legal reasoning, by regarding children as in-
dependent rights-bearing individuals, rather than assigning them the 
role of ‘passive object of concern’.14 Such an approach could be a starting 
point in guiding the interpretation of the EU law-related rights of chil-
dren with British nationality residing in the EU. The current state of de-
bates on Brexit demonstrates that there will be novelties which the legal 
systems will have to accommodate, like the fact that the UK’s departure 
will not ensue the equalisation of British citizens with third-country na-
tionals, as some of the pre-Brexit rights will be retained.15
The paper will argue that the upcoming legal uncertainties could be 
levelled out if the goal of maintaining children’s equilibrium through the 
child-related approach is applied in the interpretation of the EU law-re-
lated rights of children with British nationality. Further, since the pro-
posed approach could also be based on the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, it could also serve as a bridge for the application of the ‘chil-
dren’s equilibrium’ approach in the UK with a view to a time when the 
Charter is no longer to be applicable.16 
The fi rst part of the article will begin by laying out the parameters 
of the theoretical background behind the child-related approach and will 
introduce the EU primary law background on the nature of children’s 
rights. The paper will continue by portraying how the ECJ has gradually 
moved closer to the incorporation of the child-related approach in its rea-
soning when interpreting freedom of movement law. The respective part 
will also discuss the inconsistencies in the reasoning of the Court in the 
related case law. The last part of the article will argue that the post-Brex-
it interpretation of the rights of children can pay regard to the lessons 
drawn from the freedom of movement case law and attempt to avoid the 
omissions in the consideration of children’s own rights and interests. In 
this regard, the children’s equilibrium concept can be backed up by a 
child-related approach aimed at underlining children’s individual rights 
14 ibid.
15 For instance, the conditions for EU citizens of the right of residence under European law 
will apply for UK citizens residing within the Union. See Commission, ‘Draft Agreement on 
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the Eu-
ropean Union and the European Atomic Energy Community’ (Position paper Commission to 
EU27) TF50 (2018) 35, art 12.
16 Experts on the topic of children’s rights protection in the UK state that one of the biggest 
concerns is that Brexit will lead to the removal of the children’s rights guarantees stemming 
from the EU Charter. See Brexit and Children Coalition, ‘Making Brexit Work for Children: 
The Impact of Brexit on Children and Young People’ (The Children’s Society, November 
2017) 6 <www.childrenssociety.org.uk/what-we-do/resources-and-publications/making-
brexit-work-for-children> accessed 3 August 2018.
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for the development of reciprocal approaches for the protection of chil-
dren’s rights, especially in view of the legal uncertainties stemming from 
the unprecedented withdrawal of an EU Member State.   
2. The nature of children’s rights 
Some authors have argued that one of the greatest concerns sur-
rounding the legal deliberation of children’s rights is the tendency for 
the interests of the child to become ‘subsumed by’ or to be overlooked 
in the deliberation of adults’ interests.17 Hence, the establishment of an 
approach which could avoid the aforementioned threat demands a the-
oretical foundation which is able to prove that children are bearers of 
individual rights.18 
2.1 Theoretical background
The debate on the exact nature of children’s rights is certainly not 
new. Over the years it has acquired different nuances, but in general it 
is constituted of two main opposing views. First of all, there are those 
who claim that children do not or should not be treated as rights holders. 
Namely, the supporters of the so-called ‘power’ or ‘will’ theory stipulate 
that only those who have volitional capacities, or in other words have 
the power to claim and exercise their rights, could be deemed as rights 
bearers. Such theorists argue that rights are understood as the ‘norma-
tive powers to determine the obligations of others’ after the rights bearer 
has exercised his or her will.19 Since it could be the case that children 
are not able to articulate their will and demonstrate preference, it can be 
concluded that they may not be autonomous rights holders.  
Others go on to argue that children’s needs are much better protect-
ed when society’s obligations towards them, for instance obligations on 
the side of institutions and parents, are well defi ned. This argument fol-
lows the logic that fundamental rights are rather blurred and frequently 
do not provide clear guidance on what is to be the result and the exact 
implication of these rights and the resulting obligations.20
17 Stalford, Hollingsworth and Gilmore (n 13) 10.
18 M Klaassen and P Rodrigues, ‘The Best Interests of the Child in EU Family Reunifi cation 
Law: A Plea for More Guidance on the Role of Article 24(2) Charter’ (2017) 19(2) European 
Journal of Migration and Law 191, 198.
19 T Campbell, ‘The Rights of Minors: As Persons, as Child, as Juvenile, as Future Adult’ 
(1992) 6(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1, 2.
20 O O’Neill, ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives’ (1992) 6 International Journal of Law 
and the Family 24, 39.
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The fi rst objection to the idea that children could not be regard-
ed as autonomous rights bearers is premised on the idea that there is 
a privileged group of rights holders who qualify as rights bearers by 
meeting certain criteria. This theory not only disregards the fundamen-
tal character of the idea of the universality of human rights, but also 
could deny the autonomous rights not only of children, but of many so-
cial groups, which do not ‘meet’ the pre-set conditions.21 The conclusion 
that this theory reaches is that rights can result in certain implications 
and obligations only for those that can demand them. It can be inferred 
that small children, who have no capacity to claim their rights, have no 
rights. A possible caveat which will allow the power theory to go around 
this striking logic is that a given proxy, such as the parent, may exercise 
certain ‘discretionary powers’ on behalf of the child, which would cover 
the child’s needs.22 However, the rights bearer in question will still be 
the one exercising power and being the ultimate rights holder. A possible 
counter-argument to this claim is that once a proxy exercises his or her 
power in order to promulgate the interests of a child, it follows that the 
child has rights in the fi rst place, which are the very foundation for the 
exercise of the claim by the proxy.23
The second view basically argues that in caring for children’s needs, 
consideration should not be given to children’s fundamental rights, as 
they do not provide guidance on the resulting obligations. Rather, the ac-
cent should be put on the duties that the different societal actors have vis-
à-vis children in determining children’s welfare.24 This rather paternal-
istic approach could perhaps function in an ideal scenario, in which the 
societal actors are fully sustainable, always have the best interest of the 
child at the centre of their actions and, last, it should be ascertained that 
the interests of these actors coincide with the interests of the child. The 
achievement of such perfect conditions, however, is quite impossible, given 
the numerous social and family unit abruptions which may occur.25 As 
other authors have also argued, the idea that children’s interests always 
21 Campbell (n 19) 3.
22 ibid. 
23 ibid, 4.
24 Some authors claim that such reasoning turns children into objects, rather than sub-
jects of rights whose welfare is decided for them, thus preventing children from possessing 
rights in any ‘meaningful sense’.  See J Eekelaar, ‘The Importance of Thinking That Chil-
dren Have Rights’ 6(1) International Journal of Law and the Family 221.
25 For instance, Eurostat data for 2017 demonstrate that the number of marriages in the 
EU continues to fall, while the number of divorces increases. Eurostat, ‘Marriage and Di-
vorce Statistics’ (Eurostat, June 2018) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics> accessed 15 April 2018.
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coincide with the interests of the parent is simply wrong.26 Furthermore, 
occurrences such as Brexit could stir and shake the very foundations 
upon which the given institutional narrative functions. In times of change 
and instability, it is crucial that there is a strong legal approach to deter-
mining the application and derived obligations for the realisation of the 
children’s human rights in question. A theory which recognises that the 
interests of children could be of such crucial signifi cance that they need to 
be protected by rights is therefore much sounder in terms of contributing 
to the protection of the needs of this vulnerable social group.27
2.2 European law background 
From a historical perspective, children’s rights seem to be draw-
ing ever-greater attention in European legal discourse.28 However, even 
if children and children-specifi c issues are being increasingly referred 
to, criticism has been voiced that their rights are mostly framed as an 
additive to their parents’ rights. To illustrate, some claimed that chil-
dren are ‘passive benefi ciaries or victims of derived entitlement and their 
status is very much a consequence of their parents’ employment status 
and relationships; they are the invisible appendages of the breadwinning 
migrant family’.29 This conclusion is inevitably based on the tension in-
herent in the nature of EU citizenship between market and Union citi-
zenship. Arguably, market citizenship is the more developed strand, as 
it consists of rights which in fact represent active and passive market 
rights, which formed the very basis of European law.30 Union citizenship, 
on the contrary, refers to the rights granted to every EU citizen as such, 
26 H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Modern 
Studies in European Law, vol 32, Hart Publishing 2012) 48. Some authors look into the 
collision between extreme religious views and the protection of children’s rights: C Shelley, 
‘Beating Children Is Wrong, Isn’t It? Resolving Confl icts in the Encounter between Religious 
Worldviews and Child Protection’ (2013) 15(2) Ecclesiastical Law Society 130.
27 Campbell (n 19) 5.
28 L Ackers and H Stalford, A Community for Children? Children, Citizenship, and Internal 
Migration in the EU (Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Series, Ashgate 2004) 199; 
Stalford (n 12) 212.
29 L Ackers and H Stalford, ‘Children, Migration and Citizenship in the European Union: 
Intra-Community Mobility and the Status of Children in EC Law’ (1999) 21 Children and 
Youth 987, 1007.
30 Market citizenship is said to connect the freedoms granted to EU citizens by the EU trea-
ties to the functioning of the internal market. On the basis of this process, EU citizens can 
exercise active market rights, such as the freedom to pursue economic activity throughout 
the Union, and passive market rights, like consumer protection rights. For more, see P van 
Dijk (ed), European Community Law and Rights in Europe (Collected Courses of the Acad-
emy of European Law 1995, vol 6, book 1, Martinus Nijhof Publishers 1998) 169; J Shaw, 
‘Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-national Membership?’ (1998) <https://jeanmon-
netprogram.org/archive/papers/97/97-06-.html> accessed 21 November 2018.
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regardless of whether the market citizenship aspect has been activated 
and there has been cross-border economic activity.31 The debate on the 
exact nature of EU citizenship has taken quite opposing views, from de-
fi ning the status as an ‘exercise in public relations’, to concluding that 
it has evolved in such a way that is has become a ‘new fundamental 
freedom beyond market integration’.32 In any case, the status of EU citi-
zenship represents a unique supranational legal structure, which could 
be criticised for adapting its implications to the characteristics of the 
holder.33 
Even so, the phenomenon of EU citizenship has dramatically altered 
the state of the debate on citizens’ rights in the European Union. The 
exact scope and limits of the consequences stemming from the status 
of Union citizenship could best be observed when applied to some of 
the most vulnerable groups in society, such as children. As non-market 
actors under EU law (and if bearing the nationality of a Member State) 
children can be defi ned as holders of the Union citizenship status, as 
outlined above. It could be inferred that the inconsistencies in the na-
ture of EU citizenship are to colour the implication of this status when it 
comes to defi ning its implication for children. 
The protection of the rights of the child are laid down in two funda-
mental sources of EU law, namely the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which 
has acquired the status of primary law since the Treaty of Lisbon entered 
into force.34 Specifi cally, Article 3 TEU defi nes the protection and promo-
tion of children’s rights as one of the objectives of the Union. Article 24 
of the Charter defi nes the fundamental rights of the child in three steps. 
In the fi rst place, it recognises the children’s right to protection and care. 
Then, it goes on to assert that children can express their views freely 
and that these views are to be taken into consideration, in line with the 
child’s age and maturity. It might seem paradoxical that the reference to-
wards the importance of the child’s will is preceded by the declaration of 
31 F Wollenschläger, ‘A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Cit-
izenship and Its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration’ 
(2011) 17(1) European Law Journal 1, 1.
32 F Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt: Die Herausbildung der Unionsbürgerschaft 
im unionsrechtlichen Freizügigkeitsregime (Verfassungsentwicklung in Europa vol 2 [Un-
veränderter Nachdruck 2017 der Ausgabe von 2007], Mohr Siebeck 2017) 2.
33 D Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Diffi cult Rela-
tionship between Status and Rights’ (2009) 15(2) Columbia Journal of European Law 169. 
Charlotte O’Brien argues that in the current EU citizenship framework ‘rights do not attach 
to personhood; rather rights are triggered, interpreted, delineated and weighed according to 
a miscellany of conditions’. See O’Brien (6) 1643.
34 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Offi ce national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2010:560, 
Opinion of AG Sharpston,  para 61.
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the child’s right to protection and care. Yet, children are inherently depen-
dent on the care of others and the right to care comes as a precondition to 
the realisation of any other child-related right, including the child’s right 
to freedom of expression. Secondly, Article 24 refers to the primacy of the 
principle of best interest, which is to guide the action of societal actors in 
all dealings regarding children. Finally, it is stipulated that children are 
to be able to have contact on a regular basis with both of their parents, as 
long as this is not in contradiction with their own interest.
Article 24 of the Charter is in fact ‘directly inspired’35 by the provi-
sions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in-
corporating some of the most prominent CRC principles, such as, for 
instance, the best interests of the child principle (Article 3 of the Con-
vention). The EU, being a non-state actor, does not have the possibility of 
becoming a party to the CRC.36 Yet, it is settled case law that the Union 
must respect international law in the exercise of its powers.37 In addition, 
being ratifi ed by all of the 28 Member States, the CRC is already embed-
ded in and intertwined with European legal discourse, which respective-
ly entails that the EU has to observe the Convention’s provision in all of 
its actions concerning children.38 
2.3 The children-related approach 
European law has experienced a shift towards greater recognition 
of the best interest principle and the specifi c rights of the child, listed in 
Article 24 of the Charter, by judicial incorporation of the concept of ‘chil-
dren’s equilibrium’. 39 The legal recipe for the achievement of such equilib-
rium, however, is still unclear. An incoherent approach towards children’s 
rights may be well observed in the lack of comprehensive engagement with 
the relation between children’s individual rights, their status of EU citi-
zenship, and the emotional and fi nancial dependency between children 
and their third-country national parents or carers. Yet, the examination 
of such omissions, taken together with the direction of the chronological 
development of the Court’s reasoning, suggests what a child-related ap-
proach required for the reaching of children’s equilibrium might consist of.
35 FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European Law Re-
lating to the Rights of the Child (Handbook/ FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, Publications Offi ce of the European Union 2017) 27.
36 Stalford (n 12) 214.
37 For instance, in Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation ECLI:EU:C:1992:453, para 
9; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Founda-
tion v Council and Commission ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para 291.
38 Stalford (n 12) 215.
39 Case C-82/16 KA (n 11) paras 71-72.
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A children-related approach in the interpretation of European law 
examines the relevant provisions or questions through the prism of chil-
dren’s specifi c rights,40 by acknowledging the ability of children to be 
independent rights bearers.41 Apart from being inspired by omissions in 
the related case law, the aforementioned statement also bears on the con-
stitution of Article 24 of the Charter and the inseverable relationship be-
tween children’s rights in the Charter and the CRC, as described above. 
Since the Charter directly ‘translated’ some of the most important CRC 
principles into EU law, identically to the CRC,42 the Charter also strives 
towards establishing children as rights bearers, rather than aiming to 
promulgate the welfare understanding of the children’s best interest.
 A child-related approach in EU law looks into the specifi c rights of 
the child, by interpreting them under the ‘umbrella’43 of the best-interest 
principle and recognising the ‘symbiotic relationship between interests 
and rights’.44 One could come to wonder how the status of EU citizen-
ship, for instance, could be elaborated upon by the utilisation of the 
children-related approach. It can be argued that when it comes to chil-
dren, the elaboration of the substance of the status of Union citizenship 
requires recourse to the fundamental rights of the child, listed in either 
the Charter or the CRC, since they refl ect the special interest of the 
child, comprising his or her equilibrium. Children’s fundamental rights 
can thus guide the specifi c tailored application of this status, in order to 
ensure the protection of children’s individual interests. For instance, the 
fact that children, especially small children, are unable to take advan-
tage of the rights to freedom of movement on their own should inevitably 
be taken into consideration. The assessment of the ‘genuine enjoyment’ 
of the status of Union citizenship must therefore recognise the various 
issues surrounding the problem of children’s dependency to the respec-
40 Stalford, Hollingsworth and Gilmore (n 13) 3.
41 Some authors argue that the purpose of the CRC was to establish children as bearers of 
individual rights. See CM Smyth, The Common European Asylum System and the Rights of 
the Child: An Exploration of Meaning and Compliance (Doctoral thesis, Leiden University 
2013) 26.
42 In relation to the CRC, Smyth argues that there is a ‘fundamental contradiction between 
the paternalistic determination of someone else’s welfare and the very idea of what it means 
to have a right’. See Smyth (n 41) 26.
43 Klaassen and Rodrigues (n 18) 198. 
44 Smyth (n 41) 26-32. The expression ‘symbiotic relationship’ refers to four aspects which 
form the interaction between the best interest principle and the rights of the child. Namely, 
it could be stated that fi rst, the best interest informs the meaning of the rights; then, vice 
versa, children’s rights shape the meaning of the best interest; the best interest also rep-
resents a composition of rights; and, fi nally, the best interest could act as an independent 
provision alongside the substantive rights, requiring that the best interest is a primary 
consideration in all actions related to children.   
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tive provision of care, in addition to the other specifi c interests of the 
child, enshrined in the rights in Article 24 of the Charter.
So far, only ‘a handful of cases’ directly concerning children’s rights 
have been brought to the attention of the ECJ,45 which has also been 
hesitant in engaging directly with the provisions of the CRC.46 Argu-
ably, in comparison, the relationship between the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the CRC has been much more 
productive and has even contributed to the development of the interna-
tional children’s rights standards.47 Namely, in relation to the right to 
family life, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a specif-
ic ‘child-centred approach’, which involves not only the assessment of the 
related positive and negative obligations,48 but also considers children’s 
individual interests in the cases.49
Despite the lack of extensive reference to the CRC, the Court has 
promulgated that the CRC is a human rights instrument which is to be 
taken into account in the application of the general principles of Euro-
pean law.50 The fact that the Court has not engaged extensively with the 
Convention would not be troubling if the CRC principles were upheld and 
respected throughout the judgments concerning children, regardless of 
whether these principles were derived on the basis of the Convention or 
the European Charter. As the next part on children’s freedom of move-
ment rights will illustrate, the ECJ has engaged with children’s rights 
and children’s specifi c needs in an inconsistent manner, which, however, 
has evolved in the direction of the adoption of the children-sensitive in-
terpretation of EU law.
3. Children’s freedom of movement rights  
The next part of the article will look into how European legal dis-
course has interpreted the law on freedom of movement in relation to 
children. It will be demonstrated that the discussion on children’s spe-
cifi c needs has been increasing throughout the case law, yet this has oc-
curred in a sporadic manner, which does not provide suffi cient guidance 
on the interpretation of children’s fundamental rights and their relation 
45 ibid, 220.
46 ibid, 221.
47 For an examination of the protection of children’s rights under the ECHR and on the 
backdrop of the CRC, see U Kilkelly, ‘Protecting Children’s Rights under the ECHR: The 
Role of Positive Obligation’ (2010) 61(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 245.
48 ibid, 249.
49 ibid, 250.
50 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council of the European Union ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, 
para 37.
111CYELP 14 [2018] 99-133
to the freedom of movement law. One of the main reasons is that there 
is a dichotomy in the understanding of whether children can be auton-
omous bearers of the status of EU citizenship and the related freedoms. 
It could be claimed that this discrepancy has its roots in the theoretical 
debate on the nature of children’s rights, described in the previous part. 
Namely, when the Court debated on children’s individual rights, chil-
dren’s own freedom of movement rights were examined in the light of 
children’s specifi c needs.
However, in many instances the Court ignored the discussion on chil-
dren’s own rights, and rather focused on the rights of the parents or carers 
in the case. This manoeuvre adopts the paternalistic welfare approach 
towards children’s best interest and assumes that other societal actors are 
proxy for the rights of the child, rather than recognising or at least con-
sidering the child’s own legal prerogatives. In such instances, children’s 
own rights are in fact denied their autonomous nature and are tied to and 
become dependent on EU citizenship (or lack thereof) and/or the freedom 
of movement rights of their parents. Still, the case law of the Court has 
demonstrated a cautious, but progressive step-by-step51 evolution in ac-
knowledging that children’s specifi c needs have to be part of the equation 
on the realisation of the freedom of movement rights under EU law.
3.1 Children’s entitlement to care and the right to family life
Children’s entitlement to care came to the fore of case law slowly, by 
initially being included in the legal discussion ‘through the back door’, 
as a follow-up result from the protection of the rights of the European 
breadwinning migrant. This approach was undertaken in the case of 
Carpenter,52 where the Court decided that a UK national, Mr. Carpenter, 
living in Great Britain and travelling often to provide services in other 
Member States, could rely on Article 56 TFEU, which concerns the free 
movement of services, so as to prevent the UK authorities from denying 
a residence permit to his third-country national spouse, who was taking 
care of his children from Mr Carpenter’s fi rst marriage. Mrs Carpenter 
is a Philippine national, who overstayed her leave in the UK and mar-
ried Mr Carpenter, while being illegally present in the country. The ECJ 
decided that the refusal of a residence permit for Mrs Carpenter would 
obstruct the right to freedom of services of the EU citizen.53 
51 Koen Lenaerts argues that the EU citizenship judgments of the ECJ require slow con-
sensus-building evolution. Thus, judgments need to be examined on the background of the 
preceding related case law. See K Lenaerts, ‘EU Citizenship and the European Court of Jus-
tice’s “Stone-by-Stone’ Approach’ (2015) 1(1) International Comparative Jurisprudence 1.
52 Carpenter (n 7) para 44.
53 ibid, para 38.
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Therefore, a decision to deport Mrs Carpenter would be dispropor-
tionate,54 since she is considered as being part of the Carpenter family. 
Afterwards, the ECJ went on to examine the actions of the UK authori-
ties in relation to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The judgment is therefore directed towards enabling Mr Carpenter to 
continue to exercise his free movement rights, which is also confi rmed 
by the lack of discussion on the position of the children in the case. 
Yet, in doing so, the ECJ used the act of caring for stepchildren in the 
assessment of the genuine character of family life.55 Thus, even if the 
primary focus was on securing the interests of the adult EU citizen, the 
Court willingly or unwillingly employed the aspect of child care as being 
the trigger for the subsequent applicability of the right to family life in 
the case. A possible deduction from the reasoning of the case is that the 
rights to reside and be treated equally on the basis of the EU freedom 
of movement law are to be interpreted with regard to the right to family 
life.56 The latter was challenged and undermined in various ways in the 
following judgments, regardless of being one of the main building blocks 
of a child-related approach. 
3.2  Children’s specifi c needs and the right to education under 
Regulation No 1612/68
While in Carpenter the main rationale of the judgment was relat-
ed to the safeguarding of the free movement rights of Mr Carpenter, in 
Baumbast a main part of the judicial reasoning concerned the rights of 
the children, which were granted on the basis of the initial economic ac-
tivity of the adult EU citizen. The similarity between both judgments is 
that even though the original reason behind the judicial reasoning was 
grounded on the protection of market citizenship, which treats children 
as additives to the working adult, the cases resulted in contributing to 
the recognition of the specifi c interests of the children involved. Baum-
bast represents how children’s specifi c needs, combined with their right 
to education, stemming from Regulation No 1612/68, were the lever for 
the grounding of the residence rights of a third-country national carer.57 
Mr Baumbast was of German nationality and had established his family 
and himself in the UK, where he had originally been engaged in business 
activity. His family consisted of Mrs Baumbast, a Colombian national, 
54 ibid, para 43.
55 ibid, para 18.
56 C O’Brien, ‘Commentary on Case C34/09 Zambrano v Offi ce national de l’emploi’ in Helen 
Stalford, Kathryn Hollingsworth and Stephen Gilmore (eds), Rewriting Children’s Rights 
Judgments: From Academic Vision to New Practice (Hart Publishing 2017) 540.
57 Case C-413/99 Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C: 
2002:493.
113CYELP 14 [2018] 99-133
her natural daughter, a Colombian national, and the daughter of Mr and 
Mrs Baumbast, who had double German and Colombian nationality. The 
children were enrolled in the educational system of the host Member 
State. Eventually, Mr Baumbast stopped working in the UK and redirect-
ed his business activities towards non-EU countries. Hence, the British 
authorities concluded that he was no longer a worker within the EU law 
defi nitions. The UK authorities sought to understand whether the right 
to education, granted by Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/68,58 would 
imply that children are entitled to residence in a host Member State if 
‘the parents have meanwhile divorced, that only one parent is a citizen 
of the Union and that parent has ceased to be a migrant worker in the 
host Member State or that the children are not themselves citizens of 
the Union’.59 Further, the referring tribunal sought to ascertain whether 
the right to education could create coterminous residence rights for the 
children’s primary carer, regardless of his or her nationality.
The ECJ argued that declined residence permits would have the 
effect of preventing a child of a European citizen from continuing edu-
cation in the host country by not allowing the worker to remain in the 
state.60 Once a child has settled in the Member State, an obstruction to 
the exercise of the right to access to education granted by Article 12 of 
Regulation No 1612/68 became an impediment to the right to freedom 
of movement. Therefore, no changes in the circumstances, such as the 
fact that the parent who is an EU citizen has ceased to work in the host 
Member State, could result in the denial of residence, for the sake of the 
realisation of the right to education. Furthermore, when the child has 
been enrolled in the education system, the primary carer, irrespective of 
his or her nationality, has the right to reside with the child for a period 
coterminous with the duration of the education.  
The judgment in Baumbast portrays how the realisation and actual 
implementation of the right to education required that the care-related 
ties of children be protected. The combination of children’s specifi c needs 
and the right to education could be one of the reasons why the ECJ an-
chored the residence rights of the third-country national spouse to the 
right of access to education of the children, rather than defi ning it as a 
derivative right stemming from the EU citizenship rights of the work-
er. Furthermore, the discussion regarding the family’s fi nances and the 
requirement that benefi ciaries of the right to freedom of movement are 
not to become an unreasonable burden for the host Member State was 
carried out against the background of Mr Baumbast’s residence rights 
58 Nowadays, Regulation No 492/2011 and respectively Article 10.
59 Baumbast (n 57) para 39.
60 ibid, para 52.
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in the UK, while the residence rights of the children were not questioned 
at all.61 
This approach of the Court, ie safeguarding the children’s freedom 
of movement right and the related right to education, and the encom-
passing entitlement to care,62 goes a step further in the case of Ibrahim.63  
The judgment concerns a family, in which a Danish citizen, Mr Yusuf, 
had worked in the UK for some time, where he lived with his Somali wife, 
Ms Ibrahim. The couple had four children who were of Danish national-
ity; the two eldest of them enrolled in the education system of the host 
state. After the father lost his job, he left the country and stopped pro-
viding for his family. Ms Ibrahim was never self-suffi cient, nor possessed 
health insurance, and counted on social assistance in order to support 
her family. In January 2007 Ms Ibrahim applied for housing assistance 
for herself and her children.64 The request was denied with the argument 
that she could not qualify as a resident in the UK under European law. 
She appealed against this decision and eventually the Civil Division of 
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales decided to enquire whether 
she had a right of residence based on Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 
given that she did not meet the conditions of Directive 2004/38.65
The Court concluded that the right of access to education was not 
conditional on the retention of any specifi c residence right by the chil-
dren. Once they had become part of the host state’s educational system, 
the right to education acquired independent status from the rest of the 
conditions in Regulation and Directive 2004/38 governing the residence 
rights in the Union of EU citizens and their families. As a primary car-
er, the mother could claim a residence right on the basis of the care she 
provided for the realisation of the right to education of her children, with-
out the need to possess suffi cient resources and comprehensive sickness 
insurance in the UK.66 Hence, the right to education in the case brought 
to the forefront the consideration of aspects which are fundamental to 
61 ibid, paras 90-92.
62 In a ‘rewritten’ judgment of Case C-34/09 Zambrano, presenting what the legal reasoning 
could look like if it was following a children’s rights-based approach, Charlotte O’Brien ar-
gues that the foundations for the granting of residence rights to the third country national 
carer in Baumbast were the children’s best interests and the right to education. See O’Brien 
(n 56) 542.
63 Case C-310/08 London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim ECLI:EU:C:2010:80, 
para 59.
64 ibid, para 21.
65 ibid, para 24.
66 The same conclusion was reached again also in the more recent judgment in Case 
C-115/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department v NA ECLI:EU:C:2016:487, paras 
64-67.
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the creation of a child-related approach for the achievement of children’s 
equilibrium, most notably by stressing children’s entitlement to care.
Some authors argue that the construction of the freedom of move-
ment discourse is done in such a way as to exclude the recognition of un-
paid labour, such as the provision of care.67 In order to be able to derive 
equal treatment rights on the basis of EU free movement law, third-coun-
try national carers need either to be part of the family of an EU migrant 
worker or provide care for the children of such a worker.68 The fact that 
the provision of care per se is unable to trigger any rights stemming 
from EU legal discourse leads to unbalanced development in relation to 
the protection of children’s interests. Namely, ‘so that someone present 
in a host State for four and a half years, with a couple of pre-school age 
children, may face a welfare cliff edge as compared to someone present 
for a few months whose child is enrolled in school’.69 
Indeed, the origin of the granting of the right to education is the 
economic activity of the migrant worker. Yet, the case of Ibrahim clearly 
illustrated the evolution of the freedom of movement right to education, 
which was shaped by the specifi c needs of the children in the relat-
ed cases. The right has obviously outgrown its initial ancillary purpose 
(supporting the economic activity of the EU citizen), by becoming inde-
pendent of the rest of the provisions in Regulation 1612/68. The right 
extended its material scope in such a way as was necessary for its re-
alisation, including by taking into account the children’s entitlement to 
care as a precondition for their ability to carry on their studies.
3.3 Children’s specifi c needs and EU citizenship status
The examination of the development of the right to education under 
Regulation No 1612/68 might suggest that the European free movement 
framework increasingly upholds the stance that it grants children rights 
which eventually acquire independent status.70 However, an examination 
of children’s independent rights as EU citizens demonstrates a nuanced 
picture in relation to the recognition of children’s specifi c needs. Even 
if the consideration of children’s specifi c needs has occupied greater at-
tention in the EU citizenship case law, there is still a lack of in-depth 
analysis of children’s fundamental rights. 
  Attention to children’s specifi c needs is crucial, because, given 
their age and maturity status, they can hardly utilise their free move-
67 O’Brien (n 6) 1662.
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 66) paras 64-67.
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ment rights in order to be defi ned as ‘market citizens’. Therefore, children 
can rather be regarded as holders of the ‘market citizen’ classifi cation, 
described above, which in turn begs the question of how ‘Union citizen-
ship’ is to be understood when applied to children. 
The case law of the ECJ demonstrated that children should be per-
ceived as full benefi ciaries of the status of EU citizenship on the basis of 
Article 21 TFEU if they bear the nationality of one of the Member States. 
This argument is well illustrated in the case of Zhu and Chen, in which 
the Chinese mother of baby Catherine, at the time of the proceedings 
living in Cardiff, Wales, gave birth to her daughter in Northern Ireland. 
In this way, via jus soli, the baby acquired Irish nationality.71  
The Irish and UK governments claimed that the entitlements and 
rights of children depended on the exercise of free movement and consid-
ered the situation in question as purely internal. The Irish government 
adopted the argumentation of the ‘will’ theory by arguing that being a 
child, Catherine is ‘unable to assert a choice of residence in her own 
right’, and thus cannot be regarded as a rights bearer under European 
law.72 However, as Advocate General Tizzano stated in his opinion, the 
fact that a child ‘cannot exercise a right independently does not mean 
that he has no capacity to be an addressee of the legal provision on 
which that right is founded’.73 The Court seemed to agree, and stated 
that the child should be able to benefi t from the fundamental freedom of 
residence, granted by Community law.74 Furthermore, in order for baby 
Catherine Zhu to be able to take advantage of her EU citizenship rights, 
her third-country national mother, being her primary carer, should be 
granted residence rights, as long as she has suffi cient resources.75
The factual background of the case prevents reference to the de-
pendency defi nition, developed by the Court in relation to Regulation 
No 1612/68, which stipulates that the ‘dependent’ one is the person for 
whom the holder of the residence right is providing material support.76 
The situation at stake provides the opposite scenario, in which the bear-
71 In accordance with section 6(1) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1956 any 
person born on the island or Ireland can acquire Irish nationality. Section 6(3) of the same 
Act states that any person born on the island of Ireland who is not entitled to citizenship 
of any other country is an Irish citizen from his or her birth. In contrast, the UK does 
not grant British nationality on the basis of jus soli. See Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, paras 8-10.
72 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen ECLI:EU:C:2004:307, Opinion of AG Tizzano, para 42.
73 ibid, para 44.
74 Zhu and Chen (n 71) para 40.
75 ibid, para 47.
76 Case 316/85 Centre public d’aide sociale de Courcelles v Marie-Christine Lebon 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:302, paras 20-22.
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er of the residence right is the one who is dependent on the support of 
the third-country national carer, who seeks the right to residence. Even 
though the dependency defi nition of Regulation No 1612/68 was inappli-
cable to the case, the ECJ referred to Article 12 of the same Regulation 
and to the judgment in Baumbast in order to stress the indivisible re-
lation between a child’s right to residence and his or her entitlement to 
care. Apparently, in doing so, the Court was driven by an inclination to 
uphold children’s special needs, but unfortunately failed to do so explic-
itly with regard to the construction of a child-related approach.
Children’s EU citizenship status became the basis for one of the 
highly debated judgments in the case of Ruiz Zambrano.77 The judgment 
background concerned the residence and work permit rights of the Co-
lombian father of children with EU citizenship. Mr Zambrano had ar-
rived in Belgium with his wife and son, where they sought asylum. The 
applications were refused, but the family was allowed to remain in the 
country due to the worsening situation in their country of origin. Mr 
Zambrano applied on a few occasions to have their residence situation 
regularised, but the requests were denied. Even though he did not have 
a work permit, Mr Zambrano became a full-time employee. In the course 
of time, the family had two more children, who were granted Belgium na-
tionality. Later Mr Zambrano’s employment was temporarily suspended 
and he applied for unemployment benefi ts, leading to an inspection at 
his employer and the immediate termination of Mr Zambrano’s contract. 
In the appeal proceedings, Mr Zambrano argued that ‘at the very least’ 
he could have a derived right of residence under European law on the 
basis of the ruling in Zhu and Chen.78 
When the case ended up before the ECJ, all of the governments, 
submitting observations, argued that the situation could be defi ned as 
entirely internal, given that the children with EU citizenship had never 
left the Member State of origin.79 The Court argued that the absence of 
the cross-border element implied that Directive 2004/38 was not appli-
cable, but that the children, being citizens of Belgium, still fell under the 
application of Article 20 TFEU.80 
In her opinion, Advocate General Sharpston argued that the exercise 
of the rights stemming from the status of EU citizenship was not neces-
sarily tied to the exercise of physical movement. The line of EU citizen-
ship case law demonstrates instances in which the cross-border element 
77 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Offi ce national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
78 ibid, para 34.
79 ibid, para 37.
80 ibid, para 40.
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is either present in terms of the ties that the child with EU citizenship 
has with different Member States, rather than with actual movement.81 
The crucial aspect in the case was that regardless of whether a situation 
is internal or not, ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which 
have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoy-
ment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status 
as citizens of the Union’.82 The denied requests for residence and work 
permits of Mr Zambrano could entail that the family would naturally be 
forced to leave the borders of the Union, depriving their children of the 
possibility to realise their rights stemming from their EU citizenship. 
The conclusion of the Court sparked many debates on what the gen-
uine enjoyment of EU citizenship rights actually entailed. Some went on 
to conclude that the scope of the implication of the judgment in Zambrano 
was quite narrow and referred to extreme scenarios, where the refusal of 
a residence permit to the third-country national would force EU citizens 
to leave the Union as a whole.83 In addition, concerns were raised that 
the reasoning of the Court concerned solely the granting of residence 
rights, by leaving aside the issues of social and economic rights. In doing 
so, the decision in fact deprives the EU citizenship status of any ‘useful 
effect’,84 by in fact telling the Zambrano children that due to EU law they 
could just reside in the Member State, without having any related social 
rights in order to be able to actually do so. In such a case, it is safe to 
assume that in the face of the risk of destitution, the children would have 
to leave the Union with their father. 
A ‘revised’ version of the judgment, which recognises children’s spe-
cifi c needs, would take into account Article 24 of the Charter, by also 
stressing the importance of reading the Charter in the light of the CRC, 
given that the Convention is ratifi ed by all Member States.85  Indeed, 
Zambrano did not examine the genuine enjoyment of the status of Eu-
ropean citizenship through the children’s rights to family life and their 
rights as children, which creates blurriness in relation to the judgment’s 
exact scope and application. Undoubtedly, the children’s entitlement to 
care and the fact that the minors in the case are the bearers of Union 
citizenship status led to the protection of the residence rights of the fa-
ther. However, this does not shed light on whether the mother of the chil-
81 Of the cases concerned, Advocate General Sharpston refers to Garcia Avello (n 9) and 
Zhu and Chen (71). Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Offi ce national de l’emploi 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:560, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 78.
82 Zambrano (n 77) para 42.
83 A Hinarejos, ‘Citizenship of the EU: Clarifying “Genuine Enjoyment of the Substance” of 
Citizenship Rights’ (2012) 71(2) Cambridge Law Journal 279, 279.
84 O’Brien (n 56) 543.
85 ibid, 542.
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dren could also benefi t from the granted protection. A reference in the 
judgment to Article 24 of the Charter and specifi cally their best interest 
would imply that she should be able to do so, based on the provision 
referring to the right of children to maintain contact with both parents. 
Further, the lack of any discussion of the best interest of the children 
could be interpreted as entailing that the Court does not ‘take children’s 
rights seriously’, despite the fact that, in general, the protection of the 
rights of the child is recognised as one of the main objectives of the Eu-
ropean Union.86 
In contrast to the judgment’s lack of discussion on children’s spe-
cial needs, the opinion of the Advocate General refers to Article 24 of 
the Charter. AG Sharpston concluded that the decision of the Belgian 
authorities to deny Mr Zambrano a residence permit could result in a 
potential serious violation of the rights of children as such.87 Due to the 
care provided by their parents, denial of a residence permit implied that 
the children would have to leave the country where they had become 
integrated.88 
The reasoning in the following judgment in Dereci89 also focused 
primarily on whether there was an existing dependency relationship be-
tween the third-country national and the European citizen(s). One of the 
cases in the joint judgment involved the applicant Mr Dereci, a Turkish 
national, who had entered Austria illegally in 2001, and then married 
an Austrian national in 2003.90 The couple have three children, all of 
whom possess Austrian nationality. The Austrian authorities refused to 
grant a residence permit to the father, and the Court did not consider 
that this would ‘undermine the effectiveness’ of the Union citizenship91 
of the Member State national spouse. The mere fact that it may ‘appear 
desirable’ for the Union citizen to preserve her family together within 
the borders of her own state was insuffi cient for bringing the situation 
within the parameters of EU citizenship law.92  The difference with the 
factual background of the case in Zambrano was that the children were 
dependent on Mr Zambrano, while Mr Dereci was incapable of providing 
for them.93 Therefore, if dependency is understood in crude economic 
86 ibid, 534.
87 Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 34) para 62
88 ibid, para 63.
89 Case C 256/11 Murat Dereci v Bundesministerium für Inneres ECLI:EU:C:2011:734.
90 ibid, para 25; Case C-256/11 Dereci ECLI:EU:C:2011:626, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 
7.
91 Dereci (n 89) para 68.
92 ibid, para 68.
93 Opinion of AG Mengozzi (n 90) para 7.
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terms, an eventual deportation of the father to his state of origin would 
not force the family to follow him.
As a separate issue, the ECJ suggested a separate examination of 
the issue whether a residence permit refusal could undermine the right 
to family life.94 This dividing of the different aspects of the case demon-
strated that the Court indeed understood the idea of dependency solely 
in its fi nancial dimensions, which could not be examined in the light 
of the right to family life. Furthermore, the concept of dependency was 
applied only in relation to the Austrian spouse, rather than to the chil-
dren, who are also bearers of the status of EU citizenship. Similarly to 
the method used by the proponents of the ‘will’ theory, the mother is 
seen as the one who is able to exercise discretionary powers on behalf 
of the children. The approach can be criticised for circumventing the is-
sue of the rights of the children in the case, who also possess their own 
EU citizenship statuses. Furthermore, the lack of fi nancial dependency 
does not provide insight into the interpretation of children’s fundamen-
tal rights, listed in Article 24 of the Charter, in the light of an eventual 
decision for deportation. 
The main problem resulting from the approach in Zambrano and 
Dereci is that both judgments are short-sighted in relation to the protec-
tion of children’s specifi c needs and the respective relevance of Article 
24 of the Charter. By not taking account of the social rights applica-
tions of EU citizenship status, the Court risks stripping the concept of 
any sustainable meaning in cases where the rights bearers are chil-
dren, ie actors who cannot activate their ‘market citizenship’ in order to 
activate the protection of their rights under EU law. A consequence is 
that Member States can tap into this lack of substantial safeguarding 
of the status of EU citizenship and use it to shape their legislations so 
that Zambrano-type applicants are surely banned from access to wel-
fare benefi ts. The latter was illustrated in a decision by the UK Supreme 
Court,95 which affi rmed that Zambrano granted solely residence rights to 
third-country national carers of children with EU citizenship: ‘It is clear 
[…] that the reasoning of the [ECJ] turned specifi cally and solely on the 
risk of being obliged to leave the territory of the Union. There was no is-
sue as to the nature of fi nancial support (if any) required, nor as to the 
extent of any right to benefi ts otherwise available to nationals’.96 Hence, 
the matters related to any benefi ts were resolved under the matters of 
94 Dereci (n 89) paras 70-74.
95 R (on the application of HC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and 
others (Respondents) [2017] UKSC 73.
96 ibid, para 9.
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national law.97 In this regard, after the judgment of the ECJ came out, 
the UK authorities were quick to amend the related national legislation 
so that it excluded from its scope Zambrano-applicants. Still, in doing so, 
they were in line with their obligations under European law, as the only 
thing required of them was to provide residence rights.
In her concurring opinion, Lady Hale agreed that the UK was not in 
breach of its EU law responsibilities. Yet, when examining the national 
law measures determining the social rights of Zambrano-families in the 
country, she called for a ‘child-centred approach’98 in the administration 
of the domestic legislation, which recognised that children had the right 
to remain in their own country, but also needed the care of their mother, 
and ‘the support of the state in the shape of a place to live and enough 
to live on’.99 Otherwise, supposing that the carer cannot work, since she 
has to provide care for her children, the whole family might in fact be 
forced to leave the EU. The last could actually imply a failure of the Brit-
ish authorities to comply with European law.100
3.4 ‘Children’s equilibrium’: a goal for EU law interpretation? 
The previous part demonstrated how the lack of consideration of 
children’s specifi c needs in the Court’s case law on children’s EU citizen-
ship has led to it being a potential obstacle to the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of 
this status regarding its practical realisation. The judgments involving 
the free movement right to education brought forward various aspects 
and sometimes fundamental rights which could be seen as essential 
components of the child-related approach. Still, despite these positive 
aspects, the reasoning in these cases originated from the economic ac-
tivity of the adult EU citizen and did not amount to the development of a 
child-sensitive interpretation of the law. Hence, the comparatively recent 
inclusion of Article 24 in the judicial discussion on children’s EU citizen-
ship status was a welcome development, especially given the background 
of the aforementioned past omissions or incomplete discussion on chil-
dren’s interests and their respective protection by rights.
Namely, in its later judgments, the ECJ started to consider further 
aspects in the assessment of whether European citizenship could be en-
dangered. The Court enriched the genuine enjoyment test with several 
further factors, which are specifi cally directed towards covering chil-
dren’s specifi c needs: a multi-layered relationship of dependency (fi nan-
97 ibid.
98 ibid, para 51. 
99 ibid. 
100 ibid, para 48.
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cial, legal, and emotional), the right to family life, the best interest of the 
child, and other specifi c circumstances which could have an impact on 
‘children’s equilibrium’101 (such as the age of the child, the child’s physi-
cal and emotional development, and the emotional ties of the child with 
the third-country national parent). 
One of the joint judgments in this regard involved numerous cas-
es with no cross-border aspect, and concerned the residence rights of 
a third-country national parent who was the primary carer of a child 
with European citizenship.102 In most of the cases, the other parent, who 
also possessed European citizenship, did not provide support and/or did 
not take care of the child in question. The background thus presented 
favourable conditions for a clarifi cation of the constitution of the child’s 
own specifi c needs as an EU citizen, since the adult European citizens 
were either unable or unwilling to take care of the child or children. 
Therefore, an examination of the issues in the case could not be carried 
out on the background of the relationship between the child and the 
adult EU citizen103 who can exercise his or her EU market rights. Rath-
er, the questions had to be examined on the basis of the children’s own 
‘Union citizenship’ status.
Given the circumstances, the Court stated that a decision on wheth-
er a child’s genuine enjoyment of EU citizenship status could be threat-
ened needed to acknowledge not only who has custody of the child, but 
also whether the child ‘is legally, fi nancially or emotionally dependent 
on the third-country national parent’.104 What is more, the deliberation 
must take into account the right to family life and the preservation of 
the best interest of the child. For this purpose, even if the other parent 
is able and willing to take care of the child, this would not suffi ce for the 
conclusion that the child’s EU citizenship rights are preserved. What is 
required is a careful evaluation of the child’s multi-faceted relationship 
with the third-country national parent, which is not limited to straight-
forward fi nancial dependency.105
Furthermore, the latest judgments of the Court have underlined 
that the examination of whether a given national measure could infringe 
the child’s EU citizenship status is to have due recourse to preserving 
101 KA (n 11) para 72.
102 Chavez-Vilchez (n 10).
103 Similar to the approach of the Court in Dereci (n 89). 
104 Chavez-Vilchez (n 10) para 68.
105 ibid. In the recent judgment of KA (n 11), this conclusion was reiterated, by underlining 
that the assessment of the dependency relationship is to take account of art 7 and art 24 
of the Charter (para 71). 
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the ‘children’s equilibrium’.106 The reasoning of the ECJ demonstrates 
that the idea of the ‘children’s equilibrium’ is undoubtedly grounded on 
Article 24 of the Charter, as it refers to the best interest of the child 
(stated in Article 24.2), the possibility of maintaining contact with both 
parents (as stated in Article 24.3), and recognition of the specifi c needs 
of the child (as stated in Article 24.1). 
The interpretation of the legislation with the goal of achieving or 
maintaining a ‘children’s equilibrium’ is indeed crucial in the elabora-
tion of children’s own rights under European law. Therefore, the novel in-
troduction of the children-conscious consideration is a welcome advance, 
given the lack of child-sensitive reasoning in Zambrano-styled judgments. 
Still, the question remains of how these various aspects forming equilib-
rium are about to be interpreted in relation to European law, especially 
given the sporadic discussions of some of these rights in past cases.
To illustrate, reference to the best interest of the child does not pro-
vide information on the use of the provision in relation to European law 
since the ECJ was reluctant to utilise the term in relation to freedom 
of movement and EU citizenship law. In addition, as the overview of the 
case law has demonstrated, the interests of children were not always 
backed up by children’s individual rights, but at times were seen as is-
sues which are secondary to the problems of the adults. This approach 
creates the threat of the utilisation of a welfare-based understanding 
of the best interest of the child, which, as discussed in the previous 
part, is incompatible with the view that children are independent rights 
bearers.  
In contrast, others have advocated a ‘rights-based’107 understand-
ing of the best interest principle, which strengthens the importance of 
children’s individual rights.108 The Committee on the Rights of Children 
has stated that the best interest of the child is a threefold concept, which 
is composed of a substantive right, a fundamental, interpretative legal 
principle, and a rule of procedure.109 In discussing the concept, the Com-
mittee has stressed that it always refers to the three meanings at once. 
In addition, among other rights, including the best interest of the child 
enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention, the Committee has noted that 
children’s rights contain various elements, which stresses the ‘interde-
106 Chavez-Vilchez (n 10) para 71; KA (n 11) paras 71-72.
107 Smyth (n 41) 26.
108 Klaassen and Rodrigues (n 18) 198.
109  Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No 14 (2013) on the right of 
the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (Art 3, para 1)’ 
(May 2013) para 6.
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pendence and indivisibility’ of these rights.110 Therefore, the CRC could 
eventually provide a rich explanatory background for the scope of the 
child-related provisions of the Charter,111 if the Court is willing to provide 
leeway for the construction of comprehensive guidance on the interpreta-
tion of the ‘children’s equilibrium’ and the child-related approach needed 
for its achievement. 
4. Post-Brexit and the rights of children 
The case law on children’s EU citizenship status demonstrates that 
there has been a development in the interpretation of children’s genuine 
enjoyment of this status, to put it plainly, from affi rming that children 
are benefi ciaries of Union citizenship,112 which grants them a sole resi-
dence right in the Union, to establishing that the genuine enjoyment of 
children’s EU citizenship requires a child-related approach, aiming at 
maintaining ‘children’s equilibrium’, ie the different types of needs that 
the child can have (legal, fi nancial and emotional) and the preservation 
of the rights of the child under Article 24 of the Charter.113 
In relation to the preservation of children’s rights and fundamental 
rights in general, there are numerous concerns that Brexit will create 
loopholes in the protection of the rights of those who will be affected by 
the UK’s withdrawal.114 In this regard, it is worthwhile to examine the 
state of the discussion on the UK’s withdrawal and estimate to what ex-
tent the consideration of children’s specifi c needs is included in the pro-
cess. Since the main focus of the article is on European law, the following 
arguments are primarily directed towards the post-Brexit application of 
EU law in relation to the rights of children with UK citizenship residing 
in one of the other 27 Member States. For the sake of maintaining bal-
ance, however, the question of the removing of the freedom of movement 
law will be examined in the light of the CRC rights of children with EU 
citizenship residing in the UK.    
110 The Committee has noted that ‘Enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is inex-
tricably intertwined with enjoyment of civil and political rights’. See Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, ‘General Comment No 5 (2003) General measures of implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Arts 4, 42 and 44, para 6)’ (November 2003) para 6.
111 Stalford (n 12) 22.
112 Zhu and Chen (n 71). 
113 KA (n 11).
114 J Cooper, ‘The Fate of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in UK Law After Brexit Is 
Sealed’ (Oxford Human Rights Hub, 20 June 2018) <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-fate-of-
the-charter-of-fundamental-rights-in-english-law-after-brexit-is-sealed/#> accessed 19 
October 2018; N Bamforth and others, ‘The EU Charter After Brexit’ (Oxford Human Rights 
Hub, 2018) <https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The-
EU-Charter-After-Brexit-.pdf> accessed 19 October 2018.
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Given the high level of legal uncertainty surrounding Brexit, one 
could assume that specifi c measures are undertaken in order to provide 
for the protection of children’s rights during times of transition. Yet, con-
sideration of children’s rights in the negotiations is lagging behind and 
can benefi t from the omissions in the children’s freedom of movement 
case law, as discussed above. 
4.1 Consideration of children’s rights in the Brexit negotiations
The status of European citizenship will soon cease to be appli-
cable to children with British nationality.115 However, UK citizens are 
not likely to be referred to as future third-country nationals for two 
reasons. First, they have enjoyed the freedom of movement rights and 
have shaped their lives alongside the process of European integration. 
Second, the debates on the content of the Withdrawal Agreement show 
that ‘a reciprocal protection is to be applied to UK and EU citizens, in 
order for them to preserve the rights that they have acquired to enable 
the effective exercise of rights derived from Union law and based on 
past life choices’.116 The current state of the discussion is primarily 
focused on securing the continuation of the rights of citizens in the 
state where they are residing before Brexit day in 2019. The freedom of 
movement rights, being some of the core rights of EU citizenship, have 
not been settled upon.117  The Court is to have full jurisdiction during 
the transition period and, through a special mechanism, UK courts 
and tribunals should be able to submit to the former questions on in-
terpretations of European law for up to eight years after the entry into 
force of the Withdrawal Agreement.118
Some have criticised both the European Commission and the UK 
authorities for failing to include the specifi c needs of children in their 
propositions for the residence rights of UK citizens in the EU, and, re-
spectively, EU citizens in the UK.119 An important aspect in the assess-
ment of post-Brexit residence statuses is that children’s rights are not 
115 Except for those children, of course, who have dual nationality and are bearers of the 
citizenship of another Member State.
116 Commission, ‘Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United 
Kingdom Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the 
United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union’ (European Commission, 8 
December 2017) para 6 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-report-ne-
gotiators-european-union-and-united-kingdom-government-progress-during-phase-1-ne-
gotiations-under-article-50-teu-united-kingdoms-orderly-withdrawal-european-union_en> 
accessed 14 April 2018.
117 Commission (n 116). 
118 ibid, para 38.
119 Brexit and Children Coalition (n 16) 12.
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just taken as annexes to their parents’ residence rights. Namely, children 
could be bearers of residence statuses which are different from those of 
their parents.120 
A further concern is that the introduction of a mandatory applica-
tion for residence status can be problematic for children as they will have 
to count on their parents initiating the application. It is feasible that the 
result will be the existence of children who will remain unregistered, or 
the fact that some of them could have problems in providing proof for 
the fi ve years of residence required for obtaining settlement status.121 In 
addition, there should be special, independent mechanisms for children 
pursuing their studies, which can help them to acquire so-called ‘settled 
status’ which is to be granted to children with EU citizenship residing in 
the UK.122 The slow and unsteady evolution of the protection of children’s 
rights illustrated in the previous part of the article demonstrated the dif-
fi cult recognition and upholding of children’s individual rights in cases 
where children were holders of EU citizenship status and could benefi t 
from the freedom of movement law. The upcoming withdrawal of this 
status for children with UK nationality and the uncertainties surround-
ing the future of children with EU citizenship residing in the UK outline 
the yet unmarked territory of the ceasing of the functioning of the law 
on freedom of movement. All of the impediments surrounding the guar-
anteeing of children’s equilibrium when the child was protected by the 
status of EU citizenship and freedom of movement rights suggest that 
once the child loses these prerogatives, he or she will be left somewhere 
in a vacuum between EU citizenship and being a third-country national, 
where consideration of his or her rights can be trumped by the overall 
situation of legal uncertainty. 
The discussion of the case law in the previous part showed how the 
lack of a child-related approach, in other words the lack of recognition 
of children’s own specifi c rights and the circumventing of their specifi c 
needs, is incompatible with the objective of children’s equilibrium. By 
drawing lessons from the case law on children’s rights under the freedom 
of movement law, in post-Brexit the preservation of the rights of the child 
could be aided by defi ning the maintenance of children’s equilibrium as 
one of the main objectives of the Withdrawal Agreement which can be 
elaborated by the adoption of a specifi c child-related approach. As the 
ECJ has shaped it, children’s equilibrium is to constitute one of the most 
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cle 24 of the Charter. Furthermore, again on the basis of the omissions 
in the case law discussed above, the maintenance of children’s equilib-
rium should be carried out in a child-centred approach based on exam-
ining and considering children’s individual rights. The legal basis for the 
inclusion of the objective of ‘children’s equilibrium’ can be the CRC,123 
and the adoption of a child-related approach can be inspired by the legal 
traditions of the UK,124 the EU, and possibly the ECHR.125 
The inclusion of children’s equilibrium in the Withdrawal Agreement 
can balance the protection of children’s rights in the post-Brexit period. 
To illustrate, it is still not clear what the consequences could be of the 
use of delegated powers which the UK Withdrawal Bill will grant the Gov-
ernment.126 To clarify, the latter is to allow the Ministers to amend relat-
ed laws where they deem them ‘appropriate’ without initially undergoing 
parliamentary scrutiny.127 The time pressure and novelty of the situation 
may result in the ‘erosion of rights’ of children,128 which should be curbed 
by the obligations of the sides involved to maintain children’s equilibrium.
Another signifi cant drawback in the children-related freedom of 
movement case law pertained to the insuffi cient consideration of the best 
interest of the child. Yet, consideration of the best interest of the child 
is a base line for the full and effective enjoyment of all other children’s 
rights in the CRC.129 Arguably, in addition to stating that the future ac-
tions of the authorities will have to be carried out in consideration of 
123 As mentioned before, the CRC is ratifi ed by both the UK and the 27 Member States and 
therefore can be suitable as a basis due to its universal nature and the inapplicability of the 
European Charter in relation to the UK after Brexit day.
124 Williams points out that the UK has not yet legislated to incorporate the CRC into the 
domestic legal order. Nonetheless, the Convention infl uences the decision of the courts, 
including when interpreting other treaties, and has formed part of the work of the devolved 
administration. See J Williams, ‘England and Wales’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E Doek (eds), 
Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic 
and International Jurisprudence (Springer 2015) 68.
125 The ECHR is a considerable source for the protection of children’s rights in the UK. The 
impact of the Convention is amplifi ed by the CRC, which contributes to the child-related 
interpretation of the former. See Williams (124) 54.   
126 Brexit and Children Coalition (n 119) 6. It is still not clear what the infl uence of the 
Parliament on the fi nal Brexit deal will be. See P Walker, ‘EU Withdrawal Bill: What Hap-
pens Next? With Brexiters and Remainers Insisting PM Has Guaranteed Their Preferred 
Outcomes, Further Clashes Look Inevitable’ The Guardian (13 June 2018, London) <www.
theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/13/eu-withdrawal-bill-brexit-what-happens-next> 
accessed 3 August 2018.
127 House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, ‘European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill’ (February 2018) para 4 <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld201719/ldselect/lddelreg/73/7304.htm> accessed 3 August 2018.
128 Brexit and Children Coalition (n 16) 6.
129  Committee on the Rights of the Child (n 109) para 4. 
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children’s equilibrium, the designing and negotiating of the Withdrawal 
Agreements need to be carried out in conformity with the CRC. More 
specifi cally, as Article 3 of the CRC stipulates, all of the activities of the 
authorities affecting children need to take as primary consideration the 
best interest of the child. Therefore, the development of any legislative 
proposals needs to be in conformity with this principle, which can cush-
ion the unpredicted effects that some of the Brexit-related consequences 
may have. 
Of particular concern in this regard is the ambivalent situation of 
children in Northern Ireland. Approximately 23,000 people commute 
across the border daily, and there are almost two million cars per month 
crossing the north/south border.130 The cited numbers do not take ac-
count of other people, such as students going to schools or hospitals, who 
do not cross the border for non-work purposes.131 There are arguments 
that the lives of children in the area are often inherently connected to 
both the North and the South parts of Ireland.132 The UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU is posing the threat of creating ‘major instability for North-
ern Ireland particularly in the border counties and [posing] challenges 
for Westminster’.133 
In this case the authorities need to recognise that Article 3 of the 
CRC grants them no discretion on whether children’s interests need to 
be assessed when an undertaken action is to affect them.134 The carrying 
out of such an assessment fi rst requires a best-interest assessment iden-
tifying all the relevant elements and then the best interest in question,135 
and, second, the establishment of procedural safeguards to guarantee 
the implementation of this best interest.136 Such an assessment could 
be carried out also on a larger scale, encompassing a particular group 
of children.137 It could be argued that one of the elements in the deter-
mination of the best interest in the case would entail the preservation 
of the rights granted by the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement during the 
post-Brexit period.138 Children in Northern Ireland should not be refused 
their Irish citizenship, which brings along the benefi ts of EU citizenship, 
130 Brexit and Children Coalition (n 16) 27.
131 ibid.
132 Brexit and Children Coalition (n 16) 27.
133 ibid, 28. 
134  Committee on the Rights of the Child (n 109) para 36.
135  Committee on the Rights of the Child (n 109). 
136 ibid, para 46.
137  ibid, para 47.
138 Brexit and Children Coalition (n 16) 28.
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despite the fact that the UK will leave the Union. Another element is re-
lated to maintaining the ability of children to access health, education 
and care services across the border.139
Finally, the best-interest principle can also guide the protection of 
children’s interests in light of the uncertainties of the withdrawal negoti-
ations and the possibility of a no-deal scenario140 if no agreement is con-
cluded. The primary obligation of the state parties to consider the best 
interest implies that children’s interests may not be weighted equally in 
the long line of other pressing issues.141 Children’s interests need to be 
‘highlighted’ in order not to be ignored.142 Hence, even if an overall agree-
ment on the UK’s leaving is not reached, children’s rights should not sim-
ply be placed on the pile with all the other unresolved issues. A primary 
consideration for the best-interest principle can imply the conclusion of a 
separate agreement which is to deal solely with the consequences of the 
removal of the freedom of movement law and the maintenance of chil-
dren’s equilibrium before and after Brexit.
4.2 Application of European law
As demonstrated in the previous sub-part, by incorporating the 
children’s equilibrium goal in their activities, the UK and EU authori-
ties could safeguard and ameliorate transition to the post-Brexit period 
for children affected by the UK’s withdrawal. Next, it can be useful to 
consider which approaches could be utilised in the interpretation of the 
post-Brexit EU law rights of children with UK citizenship, given that 
such children would not be able to be simply regarded as ‘third-country 
nationals’ after the withdrawal. In the background of the current legal 
uncertainties, which could even pile up after Brexit day, the reasonings 
of the Court which took into consideration the specifi c needs of children 
could serve as a smooth transition mechanism in the interpretation of 
the rights of children with UK citizenship living in the Union.
The progress of the Brexit debates suggests that equal treatment is 
to be applied in matters concerning education, including in relation to 
Regulation No 492/2011.143 As demonstrated in the part on children’s ed-
139 ibid.
140 As of 30 October 2018, the possibility of a no-deal scenario is still quite possible. See 
P Inman, ‘ No-deal Brexit Would Trigger Lengthy UK Recession, Warns S&P’ The Guardian 
(30 October 2018, London) <www.theguardian.com/business/2018/oct/30/no-deal-brex-
it-would-trigger-lengthy-uk-recession-warns-sp> accessed 30 October 2018.
141  Committee on the Rights of the Child (n 109) para 37.
142 ibid.
143 European Commission (n 116) para 31.
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ucation rights, once acquired, the right to education bears independent 
status from the other requirements in the Regulation and could anchor 
the residence rights of the third-country national carer. Children with 
third-country nationality could also benefi t from the right of access to 
education. As for the requirement of the parent (or carer) being a migrant 
worker within the meaning of the Regulation, the case law of the ECJ 
has demonstrated that in regard to Article 10, there is very broad under-
standing of the defi nition of ‘migrant worker’, including that of being a 
person who was neither living nor working in the host state at the time 
of the education of his (step-)children. Hence, the wide understanding of 
this right, grounded on a consideration of children’s specifi c needs, can 
allow children with UK citizenship who have parents that have worked 
as EU citizens (inclusive of times prior to Brexit day) in one of the 27 
Member States not only to continue their studies but also to anchor the 
residence and social assistance rights of their families, similarly to the 
case of Ibrahim.  
The broad scope of the right to education in the post-Brexit phase 
could paradoxically serve to keep children with UK citizenship ‘integrat-
ed’ in the Union. To elaborate, due to its crucial importance, the ability of 
the child to become enrolled in the education system of the Member State 
naturally becomes a cornerstone in the process of integration.144 The se-
curing of the right to education from any possible abruptions demands 
that it fi rst and foremost needs to become independent from the integra-
tion process of the migrant worker. The specifi c development course of 
this right could therefore not only contribute to the children’s education, 
but could support the preservation of children’s rights under the Charter 
and thus be one of the bridges for safeguarding some of the child’s best 
interests between the current state of EU law and post-Brexit EU legal 
developments.
Apart from education rights, the rights to freedom of movement 
were one of the main levers for greater European integration. The 
removal of EU citizenship status, resulting in the curtailing of the 
freedom of movement and residence, will be one of the considerable 
setbacks for UK nationals, living and/or working in one or several 
Member States. Ironically, the ones who would probably be mostly 
affected by the UK’s withdrawal will be exactly those who decided to 
take advantage of their freedom of movement rights and settle in an-
other EU Member State. 
144 In Maria Teixeira, Advocate General Kokott stated that the ancillary residence right of 
the primary carer is the best possible way for the integration of the children of migrant 
workers in the host Member State. See Case C-480/08 ECLI:EU:C:2009:642, Opinion of 
AG Kokott, para 62.
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The process of European integration has also shaped the lives of 
children with EU citizenship by enabling many of them to build up re-
lations with various states. The preservation of the ties that a child has 
with different Member States resulted in judgments where, on the basis 
of European citizenship and the freedom of movement, the Court was 
able to rule even on sensitive domestic law topics, such as name forma-
tion.145 Furthermore, the Court has underlined in numerous cases that 
the right to free movement should not result in an unequal treatment of 
rights in the host state since this might dissuade citizens from exercising 
the rights to freedom of movement in the fi rst place.146 
On the basis of the latter, the post-Brexit EU law environment, even 
if resulting in the inapplicability of the status of EU citizenship for Brit-
ish nationals, should strive not to penalise those who have established 
their lives in the 27 Member States in line with the process of European 
integration.147 The legal instability of the situation requires a comprehen-
sive approach, which could ameliorate the effects of the UK’s withdrawal 
at least for children who will lose the status of EU citizenship. For this 
purpose, where the jurisdiction of EU law is applicable, recourse could 
be made to children’s equilibrium which encompasses children’s rights 
as enlisted in Article 24 of the Charter. In addition, attention should be 
paid to how this equilibrium is achieved and maintained. As the case law 
on children’s freedom of movement has demonstrated, it is crucial that 
attention is paid to children’s individual rights and interests. The as-
sessment of the withdrawing of the freedom of movement rights against 
children’s equilibrium can lead to the conclusion that some essential 
cross-Member State ties that the child has formed on the basis of the 
freedom of movement law should be preserved post-Brexit. 
145 Garcia Avello (n 9) and Case C-353/06 Grunkin-Paul ECLI:EU:C:2008:559.
146 This argument was used in numerous cases, such as in Case C-127/08 Blaise Baheten 
Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform ECLI:EU:C:2008:449, 
paras 63-64; Joined Cases C 523/11 and C-585/11 Laurence Prinz v Region Hannover 
and Philipp Seeberger v Studentenwerk Heidelberg ECLI:EU:C:2013:524, para 32.
147 As some campaigners have argued: ‘If the fundamental status of EU citizenship means 
anything at all, we need to be protected rather than penalised for seizing all the opportu-
nities that European citizenship has given us − and which were confi rmed by successive 
UK governments during the UK’s membership of the EU’. See ‘Letter to UK and EU Nego-
tiating Teams’ British in Europe (2018) <https://britishineurope.org/letter-to-uk-eu-nego-
tiating-teams/> accessed 19 October 2018. This point is particularly valid for children. As 
some studies suggest, they could be one of the signifi cantly affected groups after the with-
drawal, since the process of integration could have nurtured a feeling in them of being both 
European and British. See Coram (n 5) 7.
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5. Conclusion
The development of European law discourse has resulted in the 
gradual evolution of the consideration of children’s specifi c needs. From 
extending the scope of the child’s right to access education on the basis 
of Regulation No 492/2011, through consideration of the constitution of 
children’s genuine enjoyment of the status of EU citizenship, the ECJ 
has aided the advancement of the idea that children’s rights should be 
examined with reference to their fundamental rights status for children. 
This development, however, has not been smooth and linear, but rather 
sporadic or resulting, as a side effect, from the deliberation of the rights 
of the European migrant worker. In some instances, children’s specifi c 
needs under European law were only a background to the discussion 
of the entitlements of their parents. Such reasoning resembles the ap-
proach of the ‘will’ theorists, arguing that only those with volitional ca-
pacities could take advantage of their rights. The fl aw in this reasoning 
is that it omits the presence of the children’s own rights, which require 
examination on the basis of the children’s interests. 
Consideration of children’s own rights is crucial, especially in in-
stances where the existing social arrangements are, or would be, shaken 
and even terminated. Brexit is an example in this regard in terms of an 
event which could result in numerous legal challenges for people with 
British citizenship who have utilised their freedom of movement rights, 
as well as EU citizens residing in the UK. This is even more valid for 
children affected by Brexit who are growing up within the process of 
European integration. 
Any potential amelioration of the results related to the UK’s with-
drawal can draw inspiration from the concept of children’s equilibrium, 
developed by the Court, by also minding the lessons derived from the 
omissions of the ECJ in the consideration of children’s rights. One such 
omission concerned the Court’s ambivalent recognition of children as au-
tonomous rights bearers that have specifi c and individual needs, which 
is a precondition for the achievement of children’s equilibrium. 
Given that the constitution of children’s equilibrium, as defi ned by 
the Court, encompasses some of the most prominent rights of the CRC, 
the concept could guide the assessment of children’s rights after Brexit 
day. The utilisation of the child-specifi c approach towards the goal of 
children’s equilibrium will also enable smoother transition in the wake of 
the inapplicability of the freedom of movement law. In view of the upcom-
ing legal turbulences, the inclusion of children’s equilibrium as an objec-
tive in the Withdrawal Agreement, alongside the child-related approach, 
will be in line with and in implementation of the obligations of both the 
UK and the Member States under the CRC. 
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There should be a parallel commitment from both the EU and the 
UK on the preservation of children’s interests, which is to stand regard-
less of how the Brexit negotiations unfold and whether an agreement 
will be reached. The adoption of the children-related approach can be a 
constant contributing to the preservation of ‘children’s equilibrium’ in 
the wake of the costs of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The future lies 
in the hands of the children;148 hence the responsibility of achieving a 
‘comprehensive and robust protection for the rights of children’ should be 
of paramount importance in the ongoing negotiations.  
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